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Abstract 
 
Climate change is indeed one of the most salient and pressing challenges that 
humankind needs to address in the near future. One outstanding reason why climate 
change is such a big issue – not only scientifically but foremost politically – lies in its 
distributional aspects. This is because there are (i) differences in the impact of climate 
change, (ii) different costs to mitigate and adapt to climate change and (iii) different 
historical contributions. The international climate change regime plays a vital role in 
promoting distributional justice as it determines to what extent such differences are 
taken into account for the overall burden-sharing of the collective action against global 
climate change. The climate regime relies on the principle of common but differentiated 
responsibilities to deal with the distributional aspects of climate change. In the Kyoto 
Protocol, this principle is reflected in the fact only certain developed countries commit 
to limit or reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. However, under the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM), the Annex B Parties can implement projects resulting 
in limitation or reduction of GHG in recipient developing countries and acquire 
corresponding certified emission reductions, which would be counted towards their 
limitation or reduction efforts. Given that it gives the Annex B parties more cost-
efficient options to implement their obligation, the CDM also pursues sustainable 
development in project-recipient countries, an effort to maintain equity within the 
system. 
 
Taking the CDM as an example and analysing its sustainable development implications, 
this paper aims to address the equity issue of the current climate change regime. To this 
end, this paper analyses the modalities and procedures of the CDM and the current 
profile of CDM projects and examines the two case studies of Barro Blanco 
Hydroelectric Power Plant Project and Recovery of associated gas that would otherwise 
be flared at Kwale oil-gas processing plant in Nigeria. The analysis shows that the 
current CDM may lack the capacity to fulfil sustainable development objectives in 
developing countries and therefore, not be enough to secure equity and justice among 
countries in the climate change regime. Firstly, the absence of an internationally agreed 
legal definition of sustainable development under the CDM, as well as effective 
monitoring or assessment systems, has made it difficult to ensure the realisation of 
2 
sustainable development objectives. Secondly, the lack of transparent local consultation 
in both case studies, has failed to safeguard interests of local communities, which would 
generally coincide with realising social component of sustainable development. Thirdly, 
the distribution of the CDM projects is skewed towards large developing countries, 
sidelining those actually in need of more assistance to move towards sustainable 
development, which also undermines equity and justice of the Mechanism. Fourthly, 
specific types of projects that are more likely to undermine sustainable development 
should be more carefully examined, as the Kwale project has been criticised that giving 
CERs to such a project would rather reward illegality.  
 
Learning lessons from the current CDM, a project-based and carbon-offset mechanism 
in the post-2020 climate regime would need to adopt specific and universal sustainable 
development requirements, have monitoring and assessment system to ensure a project‟s 
contribution towards sustainable development, require strengthened local consultation 
to safeguard interests of local communities and also balance distribution of projects 
among recipient countries.  
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1. Introduction 
 
“Warming of the climate system is unequivocal”, as observed from global average 
surface temperatures, widespread melting of snow and ice and rising sea level.
1
 As of 
2007, the years from 1996 to 2006 ranked among the 12 warmest years in global surface 
temperature since 1850 and global sea level rose on average at a rate of 1.8mm per year 
between 1961 and 2003, which became faster between 1993 and 2003.
2
 Since the 1970s, 
more intense and longer droughts have also been witnessed over wider areas, 
attributable to higher temperatures and decreased precipitation.
3
 And the International 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has concluded that “it is extremely unlikely that 
global climate change of the past 50 years can be explained without external forcing, 
and very likely that it is not due to known natural causes alone” and it is very likely that 
the most of the observed increase in global average temperatures since the mid-20th 
century is due to the increase in anthropogenic greenhouse gas (GHG) concentrations.
4
 
The IPCC projects a warming of about 0.2 degrees Celsius per decades for the period of 
2008-2027 and a warming of about 0.1 degrees even if the concentrations of all GHGs 
and aerosols had been kept constant at 2000 levels.
5
 
 
Realising that joint efforts among countries would be needed to cope with this 
phenomenon and it global ecologic, as well as socio-economic impacts, the international 
community signed the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) in 1992. Since then, the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol,
6
by which 
developed countries and countries with economies in transition commit to limit or 
reduce GHG emissions,
7
 have been guiding international efforts to tackle climate 
change. In force since February 2005, the Kyoto Protocol will continue to be the 
                                                 
1IPCC, 2007: Summary for Policymakers. In: Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis. 
Contribution of Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change [Solomon, S., D. Qin, M. Manning, Z. Chen, M. Marquis, K.B. Averyt, M.Tignor and 
H.L. Miller (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, 
USA.At p.3. 
2Ibid., p.3  
3Ibid., p.8 
4Ibid., p.10 
5Ibid., p.12 
6 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (9 May 1992),(1992) 1771 UNTS 107, 
(1992) 31 ILM, 851; Kyoto Protocol (11 December 1997) (1998) 2303 UNTS 148, (1998) 37 ILM, 22. 
7 Art.3 and Annex B Kyoto Protocol 
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spearhead of the climate regime till 2020. However, when the second commitment 
period of the Kyoto Protocol comes to an end by 2020, the world will need to put in 
place either a new commitment period, or another more ambitious treaty that ensures 
the continuity of the climate change regime over the next decades. Meeting such 
expectation, the Parties to the UNFCCC succeeded in reaching the so-called „Paris 
Agreement‟ during the 21st Conference of the Parties (COP) in December 2015, which 
will shape the post-2020 climate change regime.   
 
The reason why climate change has become a big issue – not only scientifically but also 
politically – lies in its distributional aspects. This is because there are (i) differences in 
the impact of climate change, (ii) different costs to mitigate and adapt to climate change 
and (iii) different historical contributions. The international climate change regime plays 
a vital role in promoting distributional justice as it determines to what extent such 
differences are taken into account for the overall burden-sharing of the collective action 
against global climate change, especially in terms of obligations or rights of each 
country. In accordance with article 3, paragraphs (1) and (2) of the UNFCCC, the 
climate regime relies on the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities to 
deal with the distributional aspects of climate change.
8
 In the Kyoto Protocol, the most 
evident distributional effect of the common but differentiated responsibilities principle 
lies in the fact that only developed countries and countries with economies in transition 
commit either to limit or reduce GHG emissions, having regard of their respective 
historical contributions to the global warming and their higher capabilities to mitigate 
climate change. However, the Kyoto Protocol adopts flexible mechanisms to give 
leeway to the countries in implementing their obligation to limit or reduce GHG 
emissions. The three flexible mechanisms are the Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM),
9
the Joint Implementation (JI)
10
 and Emissions Trading (ET).
11
 The CDM 
                                                 
8According to Art.3 UNFCCC, which sets out the regime‟s guiding principles, „(1) [t]he Parties should 
protect the climate system for the benefit of present and future generations of humankind, on the basis of 
equity and in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities. 
Accordingly, the developed country Parties should take the lead in combating climate change and the 
adverse effects thereof. (2) The specific needs and special circumstances of developing country Parties, 
especially those that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change, and of those 
Parties, especially developing country Parties, that would have to bear a disproportionate or abnormal 
burden under the Convention, should be given full consideration.‟ 
9 Art. 12 Kyoto Protocol 
10 Art. 6 Kyoto Protocol 
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enables the Annex B Parties, which are mostly developed countries, to implement 
projects resulting in limitation or reduction of GHG in recipient developing countries, 
and therefore, to acquire corresponding certified emission reductions (CER), which 
would then to contribute to compliance with part of their quantified emission limitation 
and reduction commitments. From this perspective, the CDM might serve more the 
interest of developed countries, as under this mechanism they are allowed to utilise 
developing countries as a more cost-efficient option to implement their obligation. 
Taking into such concerns, the CDM sets forth as its objective assisting host countries 
of CDM projects in achieving sustainable development, along with assisting the Annex 
B Parties in achieving compliance with their quantified emission limitation and 
reduction commitments. Therefore, pursuing sustainable development in project-
recipient countries seems to be an effort that the Kyoto Protocol has adopted to maintain 
equity within the CDM, as it could offset the possibly undermined justice by the 
flexibility given to the Annex B Parties. 
 
Therefore, by analysing the CDM and its sustainable development objective, this paper 
aims to address the equity issue of the current climate change regime, as the mechanism 
has potential to both intensify and lessen inequity among countries. To this end, the 
section 2 discusses the theoretical background on sustainable development and 
distributional justice in the climate change regime. Secondly, the section 3 appraises the 
two main pillars which form the current international climate regime – the UNFCCC 
and the Kyoto Protocol –before examining the modalities and procedures of the CDM 
and the current profile of CDM projects. Based on this, equity concerns which can be 
drawn from structure of the CDM will be addressed. Thirdly, case studies will be carried 
out in the section 4 on two specific CDM projects to analyse their contribution to 
sustainable development of the host countries. In conclusion, final discussions will be 
made regarding how likely the CDM can contribute to sustainable development of the 
host countries, therefore, how much the mechanism serves the distributional justice in 
climate change, and what lessons a post-2020 mechanism can learn from the past 
experiences of the CDM.  
 
                                                                                                                                               
11 Art. 17 Kyoto Protocol 
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2. Theoretical Background 
 
2.1. Environment, Development, and Sustainable Development 
 
It is understood that the link between environment and development began to appear in 
the late 1960s with some books published about relevant issues and a few important 
organisations or forums established.
12
 A panel of experts on development and 
environment met in Founex, Switzerland in 1971 and prepared the so-called Founex 
Report, which recognised that “the current concern with environmental issues has 
emerged out of the problems experienced by the industrially advanced countries” and 
thus, the environmental problems resulted from a high level of economic 
development.
13
 In this report, the experts argued that development objectives should go 
beyond mere economic growth and integrate environmental considerations, not to 
mention social and cultural aspects.
14
 In the following year, the United Nations 
Conference on the Human Environment was held in Stockholm and produced the 
declaration, which further emphasised the environment-development link from the 
perspective of developing countries. It was mentioned that not only ecological processes 
but economic factors should be considered particularly for developing countries 
(principle 10) and environmental policies of states should not adversely affect the 
developmental potential of developing countries (principle 11).
15
 The specific term 
'sustainable development' became popular from the World Commission on Environment 
and Development's report titled Our Common Future in 1987. This so-called Brundtland 
report gave direction for comprehensive global solutions about environment and 
development by suggesting an integrated formula of 'sustainable development', a notion 
it defined as the development which “seeks to meet the needs and aspirations of the 
present without compromising the ability to meet those of the future.”16 Together with 
                                                 
12IISD, Sustainable Development Timeline, accessed 30 July 
2015,https://www.iisd.org/rio+5/timeline/sdtimeline.htm. 
13 The Founex Report on Development and Environment, 1971, para.1.2.,accessed 1 August 2015,  
http://www.stakeholderforum.org/fileadmin/files/Earth%20Summit%202012new/Publications%20and%2
0Reports/founex%20report%201972.pdf. 
14Ibid., para.1.6.   
15Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, 16 June 1972, accessed 1 
August 2015, http://www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?documentid=97&articleid=1503.  
16World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future, Oxford: Oxford 
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the Brundtland report, the Rio Declaration in 1992 laid the foundations for sustainable 
development to become a universally accepted guiding principle, with emphasis on 
environmental protection in the development process.
17
 However, it was not until the 
World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) of 2002 that the social and 
developmental dimensions of sustainable development, including poverty, education 
and health, came to draw more attention.
18
 According to Rajamani, the focus of the 
environment versus development debate developed over time to encompass a larger 
number of developmental concerns so that the WSSD turned the spotlight more 
prominently on development issues.
19
 Till now, there are various interpretations on 
sustainable development and a universal, generally accepted definition is absent. 
However, it is quite widely acknowledged that sustainable development comprises three 
mutually reinforcing components - economic development, social development/equity 
and environmental protection.
20
Still, the dominant view of governments and businesses 
is that sustainable development is continued economic growth made more 
environmentally sensitive, while side-lining its social component.
21
 
 
 
2.2. Climate Change and Distributional Justice 
 
The international community began to perceive climate change as a relevant socio-
economic matter much later than when the linkage between environment and 
development started to be explored. International efforts to address climate change 
began with the first World Climate Conference in 1979, organised within the scientific 
community - by the World Meteorological Organisation (WMO), the United Nations 
                                                                                                                                               
University Press, 1987, p.39. 
17Drexhage, J., and Murphy. D, “Sustainable development: from Brundtland to Rio 2012. Background         
paper prepared for consideration by the High Level Panel on Global Sustainability at its first meeting 19 
September 2010,” 2010, http://www.un.org/wcm/webdav/site/climatechange/shared/gsp/docs/GSP1-
6_Background%20on%20Sustainable%20Devt.pdf 
18Ibid., pp.8-9; Rajamani, L., "The changing fortunes of differential treatment in the evolution of 
international environmental law." International AffairsVol. 88, No. 3, 2012, p.613  
19Rajamani, L., “The Changing fortunes...,” op. cit., p.614. 
20UNGA Res 55/199, Ten-year review of progress achieved in the implementation of the outcome of the 
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, 20 December 2000 (UN 
DocA/RES/55/199). 
21Drexhage, J., and Murphy.D, “Sustainable development...,” op. cit., p.10.  
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Environment Programme (UNEP) and the International Council of Scientific Unions.
22
 
This meeting concluded admitting the possibility of the anthropogenic increase in 
carbon dioxide resulting in major long-term changes of the climate. However, it was 
only in the late 1980s and early 1990s that the greenhouse effect went “from being a 
little-known technical concern of a few atmospheric scientists to a subject of 
widespread public anxiety and international regulatory interest.” 23  The interest in 
climate change did not build on concern for distributional justice from the beginning, 
such as who would bear the burden of efforts to respond to climate change.
24
 
 
However, a lot of attention has been paid to distributional aspects of climate change 
these days, which raises concern for distributional justice in the international climate 
change regime. The three main distributional aspects of climate change are (i) 
differences in the impact of climate change, (ii) different costs to mitigate and adapt to 
climate change and (iii) different historical contributions.
25
 First of all, the impact of 
climate change differs to a significant degree, depending on countries and regions. For 
example, although more intense and longer droughts have been observed over wider 
areas, the tropical and subtropical regions have been more affected than others, as 
worldwide precipitation is shifting away from the equator and toward the poles.
26
 In 
this respect, central Asian, Mediterranean and African countries which already suffer 
high water scarcity would particularly experience additional pressure.
27
 Furthermore, 
the livelihoods of islanders that rely on fishing on the highly temperature-sensitive coral 
reefs would be threatened and low-lying countries would greatly suffer from even a 
                                                 
22Agarwal, A., Narain, S., Sharma, A., Green Politics: Global Environmental Negotiations, Centre for 
Science and Environment, New Delhi. 1999.  
23Cohen, S., Demeritt, D., Robinson, J., “Climate Change and Sustainable Development: towards 
dialogue,” Global Environmental Change, Vol. 8, No. 4, 1998, p.343. 
24Okereke, C., Global justice and neoliberal environmental governance: ethics, sustainable development 
and international co-operation,Routledge, 2007, pp.14-15. 
25UNGA Res 44/228 (22 December1989), explicitly attributed historical responsibility for certain global 
environmental problems to developed countries(para.9) (UN Doc A/RES/44/228). 
26 IPCC, 2007: Summary for Policymakers, op.cit., p.8; Revkin, A., Poor Nations to Bear Brunt as 
World Warms, 1 April 2007, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/01/science/earth/01climate.html?ex=&_r=0. 
27IPCC. Climate Change 2007 – Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability: Working Group II Contribution 
to the Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC (Climate Change 2007). Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2007. Cited in Okereke, C., Global justice…, op. cit., p.26. 
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small increase in sea level.
28
 By contrast, climate change could be beneficial to some 
regions in the short term - for example, regions in high altitudes could benefit from 
extended growing seasons.
29
 However, it is likely that low-income countries are going 
to suffer most from negative impacts of climate change because of their geographical 
conditions such as LDCs located in the tropical and subtropical areas and small island 
countries combined with economic circumstances of high dependence on climate-
sensitive sectors such as agriculture and fisheries.
30
 
 
Second, the cost of mitigating and adapting to climate change varies depending on 
countries and regions due to differences in economic and technological capabilities as 
well as differences in the type and extent of impact.
31
 As the UNFCCC notes, the 
principal way to mitigate climate change effects is via stabilisation and reduction of 
GHG. This requires not only changes in economic and social structures but also changes 
in lifestyles and daily choices and cost of making such changes varies from countries to 
countries: for instance, some industrialised countries already equipped with low-carbon 
emission technologies are better placed to reduce GHGs via changing their energy 
consumption patterns whereas even efforts to reduce a small amount of GHG in many 
developing countries can bring about much stress to their economies.
32
 In this sense, as 
the IPCC report in 2001 acknowledges so as the signatories of the Kyoto Protocol, 
mitigation policies such as emission reduction will bring huge implications for 
economic inequalities among countries.
33
 It is not only mitigation activities but also 
adaptation efforts where the differences in the cost are witnessed. In general, rich 
countries are also better placed to adapt to the economic and social consequences of 
climate change than poor countries.
34
 Whereas rich countries have resources and 
                                                 
28IPCC,Climate Change 2007…, op.cit.;Stern, N.,The Economics of Climate Change: The Stern Review, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007. Cited in Okereke, C., Global justice…, op. cit., p.26. 
29Okereke, C., Global justice...,op.cit., p.25.  
30 OECD, Poverty and Climate Change: Reducing the Vulnerability of the Poor through Adaptation, 
2003, p.5, accessed 16 July 2015, http://www.oecd.org/env/cc/2502872.pdf; Stern, N., The Economics 
of…, op. cit., IPCC,Climate Change 2007…, op.cit. 
31Okereke, C., Global justice...,op.cit., p.26. 
32Ibid., p.26. 
33Ibid., p.26.  
34Paavola, J., „Justice in Adaptation to Climate Change in Tanzania‟, in W. N. Adger et al. (eds), Fairness 
in Adaptation to Climate Change, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006. Cited in Okereke, C., Global 
justice…, op. cit., p.27; Stern, N., The Economics of…, op. cit.; IPCC,Climate Change 2007…, op.cit. 
11 
capabilities to carry out climate change adaptation policies, poor countries lack both 
resources and capabilities that the same adaptation efforts would result much more 
costly. For example, US farmers are taking advantage of advanced technologies to 
produce genetically modified crops which can prosper in dry and wet years and thus, 
compensate for a 10 or 15 percent drop in rainfall, setting aside the controversies over 
social and ecological sustainability of the genetically modified crops.
35
 
 
The third distributional dimension of climate change is that countries contributed to a 
different degree to the current challenge of climate change. In 2011, the biggest emitter 
of CO2 emissions was China, responsible for 28.6% (9,697 MtCO2) of the total CO2 
emissions
36
, followed by the United States 16% (5,420 MtCO2), India 5.8% (1,967 
MtCO2) and Russia 5.4% (1,820 MtCO2).
37
  However, the current global warming is 
not merely the result of GHG emissions of the previous year or any particular year. 
Rather, it is the result of the build-up of historical GHG emissions as GHGs can persist 
in the air for centuries. Therefore, cumulative CO2 emissions would be a better indicator 
for historical contribution for the current climate change. When looking at the 
cumulative CO2 emissions between 1850 and 2005, the United States ranks first, 
accounting for 29.3% of the total world emissions, Russia ranks second with 8.1% and 
China ranks third with 7.6% while the European Union as a whole represents 26.5%.
38
 
The same data show that developed countries represent 76% of the cumulative CO2 
emissions in the world during this period while developing countries represent 24%. In 
contrast, Africa accounts for less than 3 percent of the global emissions of carbon 
dioxide from fuel burning since 1900.
39
 In this respect, "industrialised countries owe 
their current prosperity to years of historical emissions, which have accumulated in the 
atmosphere since the start of the industrial revolution whereas developing countries 
                                                 
35Revkin, A., Poor Nations..., op. cit. 
36This figure is only by adding up all the fossil fuels burned and cement produced and then converted 
into CO2, which excludes other greenhouse gases and non-fossil-fuel sources of CO2. See 
http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2011/apr/21/countries-responsible-climate-change. 
37 Oliver, J.G.J., Janssens-Maenhout, G., Peters, J.A.H.W., Trends in global CO2 emissions; 2012 
Report, Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency, 2012, accessed 30 July 2015 at 
http://www.pbl.nl/en/publications/2012/trends-in-global-co2-emissions-2012-report. 
38 Herzog, T., Pershing, J., Baumert, K.A., Navigating the Numbers: Greenhouse Gas Data and 
International Climate Policy, World Resource Institute, 2005, pp.31-32, accessed 30 July 2015 at 
http://www.wri.org/publication/navigating-numbers. 
39Revkin, A., Poor Nations..., op. cit. 
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have only recently set out on the path of industrialisation.”40 Therefore, the resources 
needed to combat climate change should not be seen as an extra burden for them but as 
“the inevitable need to repay the ecological debt that has helped them achieve their 
present wealth.”41 
 
However, the reality is that “wealthy nations became affluent without any restraints on 
the discharge of GHG emissions”42,as a result of which poorest countries are likely to 
suffer most due to the serious impact they will have because of their geographical and 
socio-economic conditions as well as high cost they have to pay to mitigate or adapt to 
climate change because of their lack of technological and financial capabilities. Hence, 
factoring in all these aspects it becomes very complicated to answer the question, „how 
much should each nation contribute to the mitigation/adaptation so that it would be 
equitable?‟ In addition, generally weak position of poor countries (excluding large 
industrialising countries such as China, India and Brazil) in the international political 
arena adds to the already existing disadvantage that they are facing in dealing with 
climate change as it makes harder to draw a more equitable conclusion from their 
perspective. For example, even the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), which 
seems to have made lots of efforts to exert an influence on the climate change 
negotiations, has not managed to achieve much besides being recognised of their 
vulnerability and the need for special consideration
43
, not to mention the very little 
influence the Sub-Saharan African region has made on the negotiations despite it is one 
of the poorest and the most vulnerable areas.
44
 By contrast, the United States has 
dominated the climate change negotiations and had even refused to negotiate, which 
brought a huge impact on shaping decisions.
45
 Poor countries are also at a distinct 
disadvantage in influencing scientific debate, lacking scientific and technological 
                                                 
40Agarwal, A., “A Southern Perspective on Curbing Global Climate Change”, in Climate Change Policy: 
A Survey, edited by Schneider, S. H., Rosencranz, A., and Niles, J. O., Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 
2002, p.376.  
41Ibid., p.377.  
42Gordon, R., “Climate Change and the Poorest Nations: Further Reflections on Global Inequality,” 
University of Colorado Law Review, Vol. 78, 2007, pp.1601-1602.  
43Report of the World Summit on Sustainable Development, 26 August – 4 September 2002, pp.58-61, 
UN Doc A/CONF. 199/20(2002). 
44Gordon, R., “Climate Change...,” op. cit., pp.1620-1621.  
45Ibid., p.1622. 
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knowledge and capabilities.
46
 Indeed, there is an “enormous disparity in North-South 
participation in the IPCC” as most scientists in IPCC working groups are mostly from 
Western countries.
47
 Under the presumption that science is not neutral but scientists are 
influenced by their cultural biases and views, some have maintained that such biases 
have shaped the emphasis on the consequences of global warming in favour of the 
Northern hemisphere.
48
 
 
Indeed, the question of global distributional justice, that is, how the global resources as 
well as the benefits and responsibilities arising from interstate relations may be 
equitably shared between states, has become one of the main controversies surrounding 
not only the climate change regime but also the paradigm of sustainable development. 
As the Brundtland report recognised in 1987, meeting essential needs not only requires 
economic growth in poor nations the majority of whose populations are poor but also an 
assurance that those poor get 'fair share of resources' required to sustain that growth.
49
 
Therefore, in principle 'sustainable development is only realisable via a just, fair and 
equitable distribution of available resources both within and between generations.'
50
 
 
 
2.3. Common but Differentiated Responsibilities 
 
Such equity concerns have been reflected in the international environmental regime as 
differential treatment in favour of developing countries. The first appearance of 
differential treatment in international environmental law dates back to the Stockholm 
Declaration of 1972, which recognised the need to provide additional resources - 
technical and financial assistance - to developing countries to protect environment and 
that environmental standards valid for most advanced countries may be “inappropriate 
and of unwarranted social cost for the developing countries.”51 In the years after the 
                                                 
46Ibid., p.1600 
47Agarwal, A., “A Southern Perspective...,” op. cit., p.379.   
48Gordon, R., “Climate Change...,” op. cit., p.1600; Agarwal et al., Green Politics…, op. cit., p.20; Coll, 
R. K., “Probing Scientists‟ Beliefs: How Open-Minded Are Modern Scientists?,” International Journal of 
Science Education, Vol. 26, No. 6, 2004, pp.757-778.  
49World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future…,op. cit.,p.16.  
50Okereke, C., Global Justice..., op. cit., p.4. 
51Ibid., p.110; Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, op. cit., 
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Stockholm Declaration, equity concerns raised by developing countries in a series of 
multilateral environmental negotiations resulted in several provisions on differential 
treatment in the Montreal Protocol of 1987 and the Basel Convention of 1989.
52
  The 
differential treatment included in these treaties was to give more flexibility to 
developing countries with respect to implementation of the treaty obligations (i.e. 
delayed compliance schedules, adoption of subsequent base years) or to give financial 
and technological assistance.
53
 
 
In 1989, the UN General Assembly affirmed in its resolution 44/228 that “the 
responsibility for containing, reducing and  eliminating global environmental damage 
must be borne by the countries causing  such damage, must be in relation to the 
damage caused and must be in  accordance with their respective capabilities and 
responsibilities.”54 Later in the Rio Declaration in 1992, this evolved into the principle 
of common but differentiated responsibilities.
55
This was explicitly mentioned in the 
principles 6 and 7 of the Rio Declaration: “The special situation and needs of 
developing countries, particularly the least developed and those most environmentally 
vulnerable, shall be given special priority….In view of the different contributions to 
global environmental degradation, States have common but differentiated 
responsibilities. The developed countries acknowledge the responsibility that they bear 
in the international pursuit of sustainable development in view of the pressures their 
societies place on the global environment and of the technologies and financial 
resources they command.” 56 According to Sands, the common but differentiated 
responsibilities principle arose “from the application of equity in general international 
law and the recognition that the special needs of developing countries must be taken 
into account in the application and interpretation of international environmental laws.”57 
                                                                                                                                               
principles 12 and 23. 
52Rajamani, L., “The Changing fortunes...,” op. cit., p.608. 
53Ibid., p.608.  
54UNGA Res 44/228, United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, 85
th
 plenary 
meeting,22 December1989, (UN Doc A/RES/44/228). 
55Rajamani, L., “The Changing fortunes...,” op. cit., p.608. 
56Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, Principles 6&7, June 1992, accessed 6 December 
2015, http://www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?documentid=78&articleid=1163.  
57Sands, P., Principles of International Environmental Law (Vol. 1), Manchester; Manchester University 
Press, 1995, pp.217-220. Cited in Okereke, C., Global justice…, op. cit., p.112. 
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The common but differentiated responsibilities principle then served as a basic element 
of UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol and was applied through differential treatment with 
respect to the central obligations such as emissions reduction targets and timetables, on 
top of other forms of differential treatment which already appeared in the previous 
treaties.
58
 Developing countries managed to negotiate this form of differentiation as 
there was an understanding that “the largest share of historical and current GHG 
emissions had originated in developed countries, that per capita emissions in developing 
countries are still low, and that the share of global emissions from developing countries 
will grow to meet their social and developmental needs.”59 
 
However, as emerging economies like China, India and Brazil grew rapidly in the mid-
2000s and the differences in economic capabilities and positions towards climate 
change mitigation among the group of developing countries(G-77) grew wider, the 
justification for differential treatment in favour of developing countries weakened.
60
 
The decision in the 17th COP in Durban in 2011 to negotiate  „a Protocol, another legal 
instrument or agreed outcome with legal force under the Convention applicable to all‟, 
without a reference to „equity‟ or „common but differentiated responsibilities‟ reflects 
such a trend.
61
  However, a future regime with weakened concept of differential 
treatment, or common but differentiated responsibilities, would even aggravate the 
problem of equity and justice that the climate change entails.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
58Rajamani, L., “The Changing fortunes...,” op. cit., p.611.  
59Ibid., pp.611-2.  
60Ibid., pp.614-5. 
61Rajamani, L., “The Changing fortunes...,” op. cit., p.618. 
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3. UNFCCC, Kyoto Protocol and Clean Development 
Mechanism 
 
3.1. Development of UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol 
 
The current international regime on climate change is based on the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which was signed in the Rio 
Earth Summit in 1992 and came into force in 1994. The UNFCCC stipulates the 
principles guiding its objective and general obligations for countries and establishes a 
mechanism which allows the Parties to negotiate concrete measures and specific legal 
obligations via COPs, the so-called annual meetings.  
 
As set out in Article 2 UNFCCC, the ultimate objective of this convention is to 
“stabilise greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent 
dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system” while allowing natural 
adaptation of ecosystems, ensuring unthreatened food production and enabling 
economic development in a sustainable manner. According to Article 3 UNFCCC, the 
principles include (i) the protection of the climate system “on the basis of equity and in 
accordance with the Parties‟ common but differentiated responsibilities and respective 
capabilities (3.1.)”, (ii) full consideration of the specific needs and special 
circumstances of developing countries (3.2.), (iii) the need of “taking precautionary 
measures to anticipate, prevent or minimize the causes of climate change and mitigate 
its adverse effects” (3.3), (iv) the promotion of sustainable development (3.4), (v) the 
cooperation among countries to enable sustainable economic growth and development 
and better response to climate change (3.5). In particular, the principle of the common 
but differentiated responsibilities has consolidated its pivotal position in successive 
climate change negotiations, guiding not only the structure and mechanisms of the 
Kyoto Protocol but also other subsequent decisions. In addition, under the UNFCCC, all 
parties have the obligations of developing and publishing the national inventories of 
GHG emissions, formulating and implementing regional measures to mitigate and adapt 
to climate change and promoting and cooperating in the development and diffusion of 
technologies and practices which can reduce GHG emissions, among others.   
 
17 
The UNFCCC thus providing the foundational international legal instrument for the so-
called climate change regime, it is then complemented by the Kyoto Protocol, which 
was adopted in 1997 as a legally binding international agreement which assigns specific 
obligations for individual countries by setting quantified limitation or reduction targets 
of GHG emissions. Based on the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, 
the Kyoto Protocol obliges only the Annex B countries of the Protocol, which are 
developed countries and countries with economies in transition, to reduce their GHG 
emissions to their quantified targets.  The Protocol entered into force in 2005 and 
during its first commitment period from 2008 to 2012, 37 industrialised countries and 
the European Community committed to reduce GHG emissions to an average of five 
percent against 1990 levels. For the ongoing second commitment period from 2013 to 
2020, the slightly different composition of the Parties has committed to reduce GHG 
emissions by at least 18 percent below 1990 levels.
62
Special consideration is also given 
so that developing countries which voluntarily assume binding emissions targets have 
the option of using a different base year than 1990 to measure their GHG reductions and 
are afforded a certain degree of flexibility.
63
 
 
Besides that the Kyoto Protocol obliges Annex B Parties to reduce their GHG emissions, 
it has another significant trait as it adopts three flexible mechanisms – Joint 
Implementation, CDM and Emissions Trading –to enable the Annex B Parties to meet 
their reduction targets in a flexible as well as cost-effective manner. The flexibility in 
this sense refers to „spatial flexibility‟ in that those mechanisms, which are commonly 
called as „flexible mechanisms‟ or „Kyoto mechanisms‟, allow countries which have to 
pay high costs to reduce GHG emissions, for example, can invest projects in other 
countries which can give lower-cost options to meet the same targets, although domestic 
measures still need to be the principal way to meet the emission reduction or limitation 
targets and these mechanisms should only be supplementary.
64
In accordance with their 
underlying rationale, the flexible mechanisms are thought to have the advantage of 
“bringing about global environmental benefits at the lowest possible cost by exploiting 
                                                 
62Ibid. 
63 Art. 3(6) & 3(7) Kyoto Protocol 
64Cullet, P., “Equity and Flexibility Mechanisms in the Climate Change Regime: Conceptual and 
Practical Issues,” Review of European Community and International Environmental Law, Vol. 8, No. 2, p. 
171.  
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comparative advantage opportunities.” 65  However, such flexibility has been 
controversial. In general, the European Union and developing countries have favoured 
less access to flexibility mechanisms in the interest of “protecting the environmental 
integrity of the reduction commitments,” as such flexibility could encourage Annex B 
Parties to meet their emissions reduction target without domestic efforts.
66
 By contrast, 
most Annex B Parties have argued against such restrictions as impeding economic 
efficiency.”67Therefore, the principle of common but differentiated responsibility is 
embedded in the concept of the mechanisms in that developing countries without 
commitments under the Protocol are also asked to collaborate to achieve the common 
goal of stabilising the GHG concentrations by providing lower-cost options to the 
Annex B Parties. Article 6 Kyoto Protocol sets out the Joint Implementation mechanism, 
according to which any Annex B Party with quantified GHG emission limitation or 
reduction commitments can earn emission reduction units (ERUs) resulting from 
projects implemented in another Annex B Party, aimed at “reducing anthropogenic 
emissions by sources or enhancing anthropogenic removals by sinks of greenhouse 
gases in any sector of the economy”. Like the Joint Implementation, the CDM is also a 
project-based mechanism as Annex B Parties can earn the CERs accruing from projects. 
However, the difference is that under the CDM, the Annex B Parties earn such 
emissions units by implementing projects in non-Annex I Parties, which are developing 
countries. The article 17 of the Protocol allows Emissions Trading among the Annex B 
Parties for the purposes of fulfilling their emission limitation or reduction commitments. 
The Emissions Trading mechanism allows countries to sell or buy their “assigned 
amount units(AAUs)”, which are quantified levels of allowed emissions for each of the 
Annex B Parties in order to meet their reduction or limitation targets countries that are 
over their targets can buy AAUs from other countries which have spare AAUs.
68
 In the 
Emissions Trading mechanism, countries can trade not only AAUs but also ERUs and 
CERs, which are accrued from the other two flexible mechanisms. As the Kyoto 
protocol does not establish a single universal emissions trading scheme but instead sets 
                                                 
65Ibid., p.171 
66 Wirth, D. A., “The Sixth Session (Part Two) and Seventh Session of the Conference of the Parties to 
the Framework Convention on Climate Change: Current Developments,” American Journal of 
International Law, Vol.96, 2002, pp.648-660, cited in Gordon, R., “Climate Change...,” op. cit., p.1588. 
67Gordon, R., “Climate Change...,” op. cit., p.1588. 
68UNFCCC, International Emissions Trading, accessed 30 July 2015, 
http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/mechanisms/emissions_trading/items/2731.php. 
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out a framework for the mechanism of emissions trading, there have been different 
emissions trading schemes in operation, among which the European Union emissions 
trading scheme is the biggest.  
 
 
3.2. Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) 
69
 
 
Of the three flexible mechanisms, the CDM seems to be the most relevant instrument 
regarding equity concerns in climate change. Joint Implementation and Emissions 
Trading only engage countries with emission reduction or limitation commitments 
under the Kyoto Protocol and therefore, have rather indirect and most likely smaller 
implications for developing countries. However, the CDM directly engages developing 
countries in its operation as recipient countries of the accredited projects. According to 
Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol, which defines the CDM, the objective of the 
mechanism is not only to assist Annex B Parties in achieving compliance with their 
quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments but also to assist non-Parties 
to the Annex I of the UNFCCC, which are developing countries, in achieving 
sustainable development. The underlying idea is that by developed countries 
implementing certain projects with sustainable development objective, the recipient 
developing countries can benefit not only from the new investment itself such as 
increased economic activity, job creation and improvement of livelihoods but also 
transfer or diffusion of environment-friendly technologies.
70
After Article 12 of the 
Protocol introduced the idea of the new mechanism, modalities and procedures were 
elaborated to ensure transparency, efficiency and accountability of the CDM at the first 
session of the Conference of the Parties. 
 
3.2.1. Modalities and Procedures 
 
The institutional framework for the governance of the CDM comprises three important 
                                                 
69UNFCCC, The Mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol, accessed 30 July 2015, 
http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/mechanisms/items/1673.php;  
UNFCCC, Clean Development Mechanism, accessed 30 July 2015, http://cdm.unfccc.int/index.html, 
http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/mechanisms/clean_development_mechanism/items/2718.php. 
70UNFCCC, CDM benefits, accessed 30 July 2015, http://cdm.unfccc.int/about/dev_ben/index.html. 
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bodies. Under the overarching authority of the COP/MOP, which provides general 
guidance to the CDM, the Executive Board manages and supervises the CDM.
71
In 
addition, operational entities, which are accredited by the Executive Board and 
designated by the COP/MOP, perform functions such as validation of proposed CDM 
project activities, verification and certification of CERs. The Executive Board as well as 
the operational entities is accountable to the COP/MOP.
72
A fundamental condition for 
Annex B Parties, as well as non-Annex I host Parties, to qualify for participation in the 
CDM, is the designation of a specific national authority.
73
 Any Annex I Party with an 
emission reduction or limitation commitment in Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol can 
participate in CDM and therefore, is eligible to use CERs resulting from CDM project 
activities provided that it meets several eligibility requirements. These include inter alia, 
having in place a national system for the estimation of anthropogenic emissions; having 
in place a national registry; and having submitted annually the most recent required 
inventory.
74
 
 
For a project activity to accrue CERs under the CDM, it needs to go through the 
processes of validation, registration, monitoring, verification, certification and issuance 
of CERs. Validation is „the process of independent evaluation of a project activity‟ by a 
designated operational entity selected by project participants against the requirements of 
the CDM.
75
Along with the project design document, some of the requirements are (i) 
comments by local stakeholders have been invited and explanation on how due account 
was taken of those comments, (ii) documentation on the analysis of the environmental 
impacts and in case those impacts are considered significant, environmental impact 
assessment, (iii) that the project activity is expected to result in a GHG emissions 
reduction while fulfilling the criterion of additionality.
76
 During the process of 
                                                 
71 Art. 2, 5 Kyoto Protocol, respectively. 
72 Art. 20, 26, 27 Kyoto Protocol. 
73 Art. 29 Kyoto Protocol. 
74Decision 3/CMP.1 (2005), Modalities and procedures for a clean development mechanisms defined in 
Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol, para. 31, UN DocFCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add.1 (30 March 2006). 
75Art. 35 Kyoto Protocol 
76 Art. 37 Kyoto Protocol.“Article 37.(d) The project activity is expected to result in a reduction in 
anthropogenic emissions by sources of greenhouse gases that are additional to any that would occur in the 
absence of the proposed project activity, in accordance with paragraphs 43–52 below.”“Article 43. A 
CDM project activity is additional if anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases by sources are reduced 
below those that would have occurred in the absence of the registered CDM project activity.” 
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validation, the designated operational entity shall have received “written approval of 
voluntary participation from the designated national authority of each Party involved, 
including confirmation by the host Party that the project activity assists it in achieving 
sustainable development.”77  Furthermore, the designated operational entity needs to 
receive comments on the requirements from Parties, stakeholders and UNFCCC 
accredited non-governmental organisations, before making a decision on whether or not 
the project activity should be validated.
78
 Then, the designated operational entity 
submits the validation report to the Executive Board and requests registration if it 
determines that the project activity should be validated.
79
 
 
Registration, in turn, means the “formal acceptance by the Executive Board of a 
validated project as a CDM project activity” and therefore, the prerequisite for later 
processes such as verification, certification and issuance of CERs.
80
 Once a project 
activity is registered and in operation, the project participants are required to implement 
the monitoring plan, submitted as part of project design document.
81
 The monitoring 
plan needs to include the collection and archiving of data necessary for determining the 
baseline of GHG emissions and estimating GHG emissions occurring within the project, 
procedures for the periodic calculation of GHG emission reduction, quality assurance 
and control procedures for the monitoring process, etc.
82
 
 
Once a monitoring report is submitted to the designated operational entity by the project 
participants, the designated operational entity will review and determine the monitored 
reductions in GHG emissions as a result of a CDM project activity, which will be the 
„verification‟ process.83 Then the designated operational entity will certify that during a 
specified time period, a project activity achieved the reductions in GHG emissions. It 
will then request to the Executive Board issuance of CERs equal to the verified amount 
                                                 
77Article 40(a) Kyoto Protocol 
78Article 40(c), (d) Kyoto Protocol 
79Article 40(a), (f) Kyoto Protocol 
80Article 36 Kyoto Protocol 
81Article 53, 58 Kyoto Protocol 
82Article 53, Kyoto Protocol 
83Article 60, 61 Kyoto Protocol 
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of reductions of GHG emissions to the Executive Board.
84
 The issuance of CERs will 
be final 15 days after the receipt of the request, unless a review is requested of the 
proposed issuance of CERs regarding issues of fraud, malfeasance or incompetence of 
the designated operational entities is requested.
85
 
 
3.2.2. Current profile of the projects 
 
According to the CDM pipeline,
86
there are 8,602 CDM projects as of 1 July 2015, 
among which 949 projects are in validation process, 6 projects are in the process of 
registration and 7,647 projects are registered.
87
 The CERs from 2,804 projects have 
been issued, out of the total 7,647 registered projects. As a result of a CDM project, 
CERs, one metric tonne of carbon dioxide equivalent, are issued, depending on its 
contribution towards emission reductions. As of 1 July, 2015, 1,635 million CERs have 
been issued. The total of 2,221 million CERs is expected to accrue from the crediting 
period 2008-2012, from which 1,461 million CERs are already issued. For the period of 
2013-2020, 4,674 million CERs are expected.  
 
Status of CDM projects in the project cycle Number 
At validation 949 
Total in the process of registration 6 
Request for registration 5 
Request for review 1 
Correction requested / Under review 0 
Total registered 7647 
Registered, no issuance of CERs 7647 
Registered, CER issued 0 
Total included in pipeline 8602 
                                                 
84Article 64 Kyoto Protocol 
85Article 65 Kyoto Protocol 
86CDM pipleline(http://www.cdmpipeline.org) is the official website run by the Centre on Energy, 
Climate and Sustainable Development of the UNEP DTU Partnership, where the status of CDM projects 
is updated on a regular basis. This section is based on the data from the CDM pipeline website, as of 1 
July, 2015. 
87The CDM Pipeline includes CDM projects from the validation stage, from which the 30 days of the 
public comment period starts. Therefore, the total of 8,602 CDM projects excludes projects at the stage of 
designing Project Idea Notes or at any stage before validation as well as projects withdrawn after the 
validation stage, rejected by the Executive Board or given a negative validation. From Fenhann, J., 
Guidance to the CDM & JI Pipelines, February 2008, 
http://www.cdmpipeline.org/publications/GuidanceCDMpipeline.pdf. 
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Withdrawn 62 
Rejected by EB 272 
Validation negative by DOE 267 
Validation terminated by DOE 2022 
Total number of different projects 11225 
Table 1. The number of CDM projects
88
 
 
As of the 1 July, 2015, 114 countries in total have hosted or are expected to host at least 
one CDM project. However, the distribution of the 8,602 projects among those countries 
is starkly imbalanced. The number of the projects which will have been hosted by the 
top 10 countries represents 85.3% of the 8,602 projects, with China alone having hosted 
about 45.6% of the projects. By contrast, the 121 projects have been hosted by 32 
countries of the so-called group of Least Developed Countries (LDCs), which accounts 
for a mere 1.4% of the 8,602 projects.
89
  Furthermore, the Small Island Developing 
Countries (SIDCs) have hosted 39 projects.
90
 The Figure 1 below demonstrates the 
CDM projects in top 10 host countries and LDCs as a fraction of total projects in the 
CDM pipeline.  
                                                 
88UNEP DTU Partnership, Status of CDM projects(table), CDM/JI Pipeline Overview Page, accessed 10 
July 2015 from http://www.cdmpipeline.org/overview.htm. 
89The list of LDCs is reviewed every three years by the United Nations Economic and Social Council, 
taking into account per capita income, human asset indicators such as nutrition, health, school enrolment 
and literacy and economic vulnerability indicators such as natural and trade-related shocks and physical 
and economic exposure to shocks. The most recent review was held in 2012 and currently 48 countries 
are designated as LDCs. For more information about the UN recognition of LDCs, see 
http://unctad.org/en/Pages/ALDC/Least%20Developed%20Countries/UN-recognition-of-LDCs.aspx and 
for the current list of LDCs, see http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/cdp/ldc/ldc_list.pdf. 
90Although there is no official list of SIDCs designated by the UN as the case of LDCs, the UN 
recognises the unique and particular vulnerabilities and development needs of SIDCs given their small 
size, remoteness from large markets and high economic vulnerability to economic and natural shocks. For 
analytical purposes, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development has an informal list of 29 
SIDCs. See http://unctad.org/en/Pages/ALDC/Small%20Island%20Developing%20States/UN-
recognition-of-the-problems-of-small-island-developing-States.aspx. 
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Figure 1. CDM projects in top 10 host countries
91
 
 
The concentration of the CDM projects mainly in China, India, Brazil and Mexico has 
been witnessed since the initiation of the CDM, although the degree of the 
concentration and the share of projects among those four countries varied throughout 
the period. The fraction hosted by China, India, Brazil and Mexico was about 50% 
when the CDM launched, rose to around 85% in 2006. In the same line, when looking at 
the distribution of the projects by regions, the Asia and Pacific region has been the 
dominant host of CDM projects (82% of the total projects) and the share by China and 
India represents about 85% of the projects hosted in the region. Latin America comes 
next, with the fraction of Brazil and Mexico accounting for 53% of the projects in the 
region. Asia and Pacific region and Latin America have hosted 95% of the projects. 
Africa has hosted 2.8% of the total projects with South Africa hosting 28.7% of the 
projects in the region. As paragraph 4.(c) of the Decision 3/CMP.1 suggests, such 
inequitable distribution of project activities is not something totally 
unexpected.
92
However, despite this provision requiring the COP/MOP to review the 
                                                 
91This is an original graph, analysed with the data accessed 10 July 2015 from 
www.cdmpipeline.org/publications/CDMPipeline.xlsm. 
92According to Decision 3/CMP.1 (2005), para.4.(c) „The COP/MOP shall review the regional and sub-
regional distribution of CDM project activities with a view to identifying systematic or systemic barriers 
to their equitable distribution and take appropriate decisions.‟ UN DocFCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add.1 (30 
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regional and sub-regional distribution of CDM project activities, such a trend did not 
weaken more recently, either.  
 
 
Figure 2. Percentage of CDM Projects hosted by Brazil, Mexico, India, China
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Figure 3. Distribution of CDM projects by region
94
 
 
                                                                                                                                               
March 2006). 
93UNEP DTU Partnership, All CDM projects in the Pipeline in Brazil + Mexico + India + China as a 
fraction of all projects(graph), CDM projects by host region, accessed 10 July 2015 from 
http://www.cdmpipeline.org/cdm-projects-region.htm#7. 
94This is an original graph, analysed with the data accessed 10 July 2015 from 
www.cdmpipeline.org/publications/CDMPipeline.xlsm. 
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According to the UNFCCC classification of types of projects, 26 different types can be 
categorised into 8 categories - HFCs&PFCs&SF&N20 reduction, Renewables, CH4 
reduction & Cement & Coal mine/bed, Supply-side energy efficiency, Fuel switch, 
Demand-side energy efficiency, Afforestation & Reforestation and Transport. 
Renewables has been the predominant type of CDM projects, representing about 71% of 
the total active projects(6,109), followed by CH4 reduction & Cement & Coal mine/bed 
(15%; 1,317 projects) and Supply-side energy efficiency (6%; 525 projects). The three 
most common types of projects have been wind power (31%; 2,627 projects), 
hydropower (26%, 2,241 projects) and biomass energy (9%; 771 projects), all of which 
fall into the renewables category. Interestingly, although HFCs, PFCs, SF&& N2O 
reduction projects only account for a mere 2% of the projects but represent 29% of the 
total CERs by 2012.
95
 
 
Project type category Number  Percentage 
HFCs, PFCs, SF&& N2O reduction 146 1.70% 
Renewables 6109 71% 
CH4 reduction & Cement & Coal mine/bed 1317 15% 
Supply-side EE 525 6% 
Fuel switch 133 1.50% 
Demand-side EE 269 3.10% 
Afforestation & Reforestation 71 0.80% 
Transport 32 0.40% 
Table 2. CDM projects by categories
96
 
 
                                                 
95UNEP DTU Partnership, CDM projects by type, 30 July 2015, http://www.cdmpipeline.org/cdm-
projects-type.htm. 
96UNEP DTU Partnership, CDM projects grouped in types(table), accessed 10 July 2015, from 
http://www.cdmpipeline.org/cdm-projects-type.htm 
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Figure 4. Trend in number (%) of CDM projects in each category of types
97
 
 
 
3.2.3. Equity concerns about CDM structure 
 
On the basis of the previous analysis of procedures and modalities of CDM as well as 
current profile of CDM projects, several concerns regarding equity and distributional 
justice can be detected.  
 
Firstly, CDM projects are highly concentrated on large industrialising countries whereas 
LDCs and Small Island States are marginalised which actually are in most need of 
external help for sustainable development and such concentration is a predictable result 
of how the CDM is constructed. CDM projects seek investment from private entities, 
which are motivated by low risk and high potential returns by nature.
98
 It seems that 
important factors that influence CDM investment flows are the capacity for cheap 
emissions reduction, the general investment climate in the host country and the host 
country‟s institutional capacity to implement CDM projects.99 Most of all, as CDM 
projects should reduce GHG emissions below a baseline level to accrue CERs, largely 
industrialising countries of non-Annex I parties which already have substantial 
emissions problems - such as China, India and Brazil - are more attractive to investors 
than LDCs which are only poorly industrialised and therefore, emissions reduction 
                                                 
97 UNEP DTU Partnership, Number (%) of CDM projects in each category of types(graph), accessed 10 
July 2015, from http://www.cdmpipeline.org/cdm-projects-type.htm 
98Nelson, P., “An African Dimension to the Clean Development Mechanism: Finding a Path to 
Sustainable Development in the Energy Sector”, Denver Journal of International Law and Policy, Vol. 32, 
2004, pp.615-652.  
99Gordon, R., “Climate Change...,” op. cit., p.1614.  
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would result more costly in the end.
100
  In addition, because a CDM project is funded 
by investment, the general investment climate is as important to secure CDM 
investment as to attract foreign investment in general. For example, big developing 
countries, which have succeeded in hosting a significant amount of foreign investment, 
generally have good infrastructure, reasonably efficient administration procedures and 
political stability whereas most Sub-Saharan countries would lack such components. 
Additionally, to host a CDM project, a recipient country should have a designated 
national authority which would confirm its contribution towards sustainable 
development and approve the project. However, establishing a designated national 
authority requires technical expertise as well as resources, which might not be easy for 
small LDCs to have.
101
 Considering all these factors, the fact that the LDCs are in most 
need of investment for sustainable development could only morally appeal to investors 
whose main interest is to make profits.  
 
Secondly, the designated operational entity does not determine itself whether the project 
activity assists in achieving sustainable development nor the UNFCCC provides any 
guideline including what sustainable development is in this context. Therefore, 
determining whether the project activity contributes to sustainable development as well 
as defining sustainable development is at the host Party‟s full discretion. Ironically, 
applying a rather strict criterion of sustainable development would not be necessarily in 
the interest of the host Party, considering that hosting a CDM project would be a great 
opportunity to have new investment in the country, which most countries are very keen 
on these days as a way to revitalise the economy. Indeed, it is known that non-Annex I 
countries like China and India opposed to the suggested idea of determining at 
international level, whether or not a project activity contributes to sustainable 
development. On top of this, the monitoring process required is mainly focused on the 
estimating the GHG emissions and calculating the reduction of GHG emissions with the 
ultimate objective of issuing the appropriate amount of CERs, which sidelines 
monitoring the other environmental and social secondary effects that the project activity 
brings about to the local community or the host country at large. Furthermore, even the 
monitoring process of the GHG emissions has been criticised that it is not strict enough.  
                                                 
100Ibid., p.1615; Nelson, P., “An African Dimension...,” op. cit., p.633. 
101Gordon, R., “Climate Change...,” op. cit., p.1616.  
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4. Case Study 
 
Compared to the previous chapter, where structural justice of the CDM was looked into, 
whether individual CDM projects have been serving the climate justice, by analysing 
sustainable development impacts of the projects. The necessity for analysing sustainable 
development impacts of the CDM comes from the fact that the sustainable development 
objective of CDM is one of the specific mechanisms through which the Kyoto Protocol 
attempts to ensure equity of the current climate regime. In view of the absence of a 
globally shared normative concept of sustainable development, the projects will be 
appraised from an economic, environmental and social perspective, as most project 
design documents for CDM-registered projects do.
102
 Mainly macro-economic benefits, 
which are factors to boost overall national economy, will be counted towards the 
economic aspects, such as increasing national energy supply, triggering investments, 
and developing infrastructure. By comparison, increasing social wealth of local 
communities where a specific project is carried out will be considered as social aspects 
of sustainable development, such as job creation and local community involvement. For 
any project to be considered meaningful in bringing positive sustainable development 
impacts should have positive impacts in all three aspects. 
 
Two case studies to be discussed in this chapter are among the most controversial CDM 
projects and the most frequently discussed by environmental activists and academics - 
'Barro Blanco Hydroelectric Power Plant Project' in Panama and 'Recovery of 
associated gas that would otherwise be flared at Kwale oil-gas processing plant in 
Nigeria.' Analysing only two projects of 7,647 registered CDM projects as of 1 July 
2015 would not be able to make a general assessment of the CDM‟s contribution 
towards sustainable development. However, analysing these case studies that there is a 
failure to result in positive sustainable development impacts in host countries, even if 
only in a few cases, complemented by the theoretical considerations put forward in 
                                                 
102The Project Design Document for the BarroBlacoproject(p.4) states that “the hydroelectric power 
plant project of Barro Blanco contributes from the social, environmental and economic point of view to 
the development of the districts of Tolé and Müna, so that we can affirm that this is an eligible project in 
terms of the methods and procedures of the clean development mechanism (CDM) set forth by the 
UNFCCC.”Barro Blanco Hydroelectric Power Plant Project, Project Design Document, 27 April 2010, 
p.2,https://cdm.unfccc.int/filestorage/B/O/L/BOLWGNA7FS4YKM23JCHPQ695ZIU8ET/Barro%20Bla
nco%20PDD%20v3.08?t=b2F8bnhoOHZhfDBcSqzLHo8HPRaHvmR0nKoX. 
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previous sections, could at least question the current CDM‟s capacity to achieve 
sustainable development. 
 
 
4.1. Barro Blanco Hydroelectric Power Plant Project 
 
 
4.1.1. Project background  
 
The Barro Blanco Hydroelectric Power Plant Project (“Barro Blanco project”) foresees 
building a hydroelectric power plant, with a total capacity of 28.84 MW, utilising the 
capacity of the Tabasara River, which flows through the autonomous region (known as 
Camarca) in Panama where the Ngäbe-Bugle indigenous peoples live.
103
 Initially, the 
project aimed to construct a hydroelectric power plant with a capacity of 19.99 MW but 
it was later concluded feasible to increase the installed capacity to 28.84 MW.
104
 
Although the plans for the current project by the developer Generadora del Istmo, 
S.A.(GENISA) only came to appear in 2007, an earlier attempt to build the same 
hydroelectric power plant in the same area already began in 1997 by the consortium 
Tabasara, whose concession was later passed on to GENISA.
105
 A series of  protests 
had already taken place by the indigenous Ngäbe-Bugle people during the years 
between 1999 and 2003 regarding the predecessor project and then resumed as plans for 
the Barro Blanco project were in place and the construction began. Despite the 
persistent opposition by the Ngäbe people and the lack of consultation with the affected 
Ngäbe communities, the Asociación Española de Normalización y Certificación 
(AENOR) requested validation for carbon credits for the 19 MW project under the 
Kyoto Protocol‟s Clean Development Mechanism. 106  In 2009, GENISA decided to 
increase the capacity of the dam to 28.84 MW, which accompanied an increase of the 
reservoir as well as the maximum flood level, but they did not carry out additional 
environmental impact assessment. In March 2011, the construction work for the Barro 
Blanco project began without consent from the affected Ngäbe-Bugle communities or 
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further consultation.
107
 Later that year, the project was officially approved under the 
CDM mechanism, despite concerns raised by domestic and international groups about 
the accuracy of the environmental impact assessment and insufficient local stakeholder 
consultation.
108
 In February 2012, there was a huge confrontation between the local 
police and the affected communities, with the latter blocking the Inter-American 
Highway, which reportedly resulted in four deaths. In addition, some police officers 
who participated in the suppression of this protest were accused of rape and sexual 
aggression.
109
 In March 2012, an agreement was reached between the Government of 
Panama and the comarca Ngäbe-Bugle that the previous environmental impact 
assessment report would be revised and a field mission will be sent to verify the 
impacts.
110
 During this revision and verification, a significant gap was confirmed 
between the Environmental Impact Assessment report and what actually had happened, 
including “lack of agreement with the affected communities, absence of an approved 
archaeological management plan, repeated failures to manage sedimentation and 
erosion, poor management of solid and hazardous waste, and logging without 
permission.”111Based on this finding, the Government of Panama, in February 2015, 
finally decided to temporarily suspend the construction of the dam, which had been 
demanded by the indigenous peoples who would be directly affected by flooding caused 
by the dam construction.
112
 
 
4.1.2. Implications on sustainable development 
 
This section explores the implications the Barro Blanco project has brought on 
sustainable development of Panama. As the project is temporarily suspended, the 
realised sustainable development impacts on the completion of the project cannot be 
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discussed. However, expected impacts as well as witnessed impacts in the course of 
construction until it was suspended will be discussed.  
 
Economic impacts  
Construction of a hydroelectric power plant could benefit populations in general by 
increasing energy generation capacity, thus, making energy available to more 
populations. According to the Project Design Document submitted to the CDM 
executive board, the construction of Barro Blanco dam is expected to increase Panama's 
installed energy generation capacity by 2.35%.
113
 It will also increase the presence of 
energy generated with autochthonous natural resources and therefore, replace the energy 
generation with hydrocarbons, which then would contribute to stabilising energy price, 
by protecting Panama's national energy market from the rising cost of hydrocarbons in 
the international markets.
114
 As the project was suspended during its construction, none 
of these economic benefits have been witnessed but if it was to be completed, there 
would be positive impacts at macro-economic level.  
 
Environmental impacts 
Like all other projects approved under the CDM mechanism, the Barro Blanco project is 
expected to contribute to reducing GHG emissions. According to the Project Design 
Document, the electrical energy which is to be generated by Barro Blanco dam will 
replace the energy which would be otherwise partially generated by fossil fuel run 
plants in the absence of the Barro Blanco plant.
115
 However, some negative 
environmental impacts were already expected to take place during the construction 
phase. These include the impacts that would cease to exist with the suspension of 
completion of construction phase, such as the generation of dust or noise by the 
construction works.
116
 The non-reversible impacts, such as impacts on the vegetation, 
flora and fauna, were also expected, including the loss of the plant cover and tree 
species on the banks of the river and the decrease in the space available for native 
fauna.
117
 The Project Design Document also anticipated the potential start of 
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eutrophication processes and impacts on the fluvial plant and animal life during 
operating phase.
118
 
 
Bigger negative environmental impacts were neither discussed in the Project Design 
Document nor in the Environmental Impact Assessment carried out in 2007. However, 
the report prepared by a UNDP mission in 2012 to assess the validity of the previously 
performed Environmental Impact Assessment affirmed the project s´ negative impacts 
on the environment that the dam would convert the flowing Tabasara river into a 
stagnant lake ecosystem, affecting the Ngäbe's diet and means of subsistence.
119
 This is 
in line with what the Ngäbe-Buglé protesters had been claiming that the project would 
destroy the river ecosystem that they have been relying on over generations for 
fishing.
120
 Furthermore, according to the Swyter's article, local fishermen said they had 
seen the riverbed become filled with sediments, which had affected the types of fish 
being caught and an anonymous worker from GENISA witnessed that a lot of waste had 
been going directly into the river.
121
 
 
Social impacts 
The Project Design Document states several positive impacts in terms of social wealth.  
First, the construction of Barro Blanco dam would contribute to regional development 
including local and regional institutional strengthening and an increased standard of 
living, given that the affected areas are currently with a low standard of living and 
lacking the residents' basic needs such as sanitation and education. Second, new jobs 
would be created during the course of construction and the later stages of operation or 
management as GENISA had agreed to the clauses such as “exhausting all the necessary 
steps to ensure that at least 60% of staff for unskilled work in activities related to the 
contract come from the boroughs or districts of the province where the project is 
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developed.” 122  Third, direct financing would be given from the developer to the 
affected municipalities, which would allow them to pursue their own development 
projects.
123
 Fourth, the quality of life of the affected populations situated in the middle 
of the river Tabasara would be enhanced through technology transfer and 
implementation of environmental educations programmes and technical training courses, 
which would equip the populations with the capability to manage the project area.
124
 
 
Despite the aforementioned potentially positive impacts, the Ngöbe-Buglé peoples 
residing near the river Tabasara have been more concerned about the direct negative 
impacts they would suffer once the Barro Blanco dam is completed, including flooding 
not only their homes and schools, which would force the people living on the shores of 
the river to leave their land to which they have strong cultural ties, but also religious, 
archaeological and cultural sites in the Ngöbe-Buglé comarca.
125
 However, the 
Environmental Impact Assessment conducted in 2007, which was approved by the 
Panamanian government s´ environmental agency, Autoridad Nacional del Ambiente de 
Panamá (ANAM), expected that only 6.7 hectares of comarca lands would be flooded 
and no communities would be displaced.
126
 In contrast, the UNDP s´ fact-finding 
mission in 2012, which assessed the validity of the previous Environmental Impact 
Assessment, confirmed more severe level of land flooding and necessary 
displacement.
127
The study carried out in 2013 by the joint verification mission to assess 
hydraulic, ecological and economic aspects of the Barro Blanco project concluded that 
the direct impacts of the dam construction would affect the environment and the Ngobe 
communities as a whole and should be mitigated.
128
 
 
Another big social impact has been on the human rights of the Ngöbe-Buglé peoples. 
After a series of alleged human rights violation drew international attention, the UN‟s 
Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, James Anaya, visited Panama 
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in July 2013 to investigate claims of international law violations.
129
  The report 
prepared by the UN Special Rapporteur pointed out that “numerous allegations of 
violations of the rights of indigenous peoples have been made as a result of the 
development of large-scale hydroelectric and other investment projects in Panama's 
indigenous territories,” 130  taking the Barro Blanco project as one example, among 
others. It considered that “lack of an appropriate governing framework for consultations 
with indigenous communities” has led to such alleged human rights violations.131 It is 
believed that the chief of the comarca privately met with GENISA, signed over the land 
belonging to the Ngöbe-Buglé communities without community consultation and made 
the agreements in which the Ngöbe-Buglé land was relinquished to GENISA.
132
 
Despite GENISA s´ claim that a meeting for public consultation in February 2008 was 
widely advertised and its denial of the Ngöbe-Buglé argument that they were not invited 
to a public forum, no meeting was held within the comarca, and the community was not 
directly contacted about the meeting.
133
The 2013 study by the joint verification mission 
also pointed out the appropriate consultations with the communities to be affected had 
not been carried out and the impacts had not be clearly explained or understood.
134
 
 
There also have been human rights violations in suppressing the indigenous protesters 
as four people were killed in 2012, allegedly in confrontation with the police and sexual 
violence seemingly took place, too. Although this specific abuse of human rights was 
not committed by GENISA but by the local authorities, such confrontation would not 
have taken place at all if the developer had properly carried out consultation with the 
affected people and considered their opinion in due diligence.  
 
4.1.3. Conclusion  
 
The Project Design Document self-confidently states that the quality of life of the 
inhabitants will increase, “as a result of the number of jobs available and the 
improvement in the conditions of the quality of water and river banks, which will 
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provide new leisure areas to the community.”135  However, such analysis was biased as 
it did not take into account huge negative impacts that could be brought about to the 
inhabitants particularly during the course of construction including displacements 
without adequate mitigation measures in place. 
 
In collecting stakeholders' opinion as part of preparation for the Environmental Impact 
Assessment report in 2007, only 58 surveys were carried out in 13 affected communities 
and there is no explanation regarding on which ground the surveyed were 
selected.
136
Therefore, despite the Project Design Document‟s argument that the 50% of 
the surveyed were in favour of the Barro Blanco project, it is hard to rely on these 
surveys, as they may not represent the general views of the 13 affected communities.
137
 
In the end, as the project was suspended during its construction, all the potential 
benefits pointed out by the surveyed such as new jobs, cheaper electricity charges, more 
available water, improved standard of living, new and better roads, were not realised 
whereas most of the difficulties that inhabitants worried about occurred – expropriation 
of the land, damage to the environment, displacements and temporary disruptions.
138
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4.2. Recovery of associated gas that would otherwise be flared at 
Kwale oil-gas processing plant in Nigeria 
 
4.2.1. Project Background 
 
Gas flaring is one of the biggest environmental issues in Nigeria. Nigeria is known to 
have the Africa's largest natural gas reserves but to flare the largest amount of toxic 
orange flares, as a byproduct of its oil industry, which produces about 2 million barrels a 
day.
139
 These gas flares not only result in emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2) and 
uncombusted methane (CH4) and but could also be used for power generation if trapped. 
However, the Nigerian populations are short of power supply as it is cheaper to flare gas 
than to tap a disorganised local market.
140
 Underdeveloped domestic market, lack of 
effective regulation, lack of local infrastructure, remoteness of location, technical 
limitations and uncertainty have been identified as fundamental causes of gas flaring in 
Nigeria.
141
Because of the harmful environmental effect of gas flaring and the wasting of 
potential energy source, the gas flaring has been prohibited since 1984 with the 
enactment of Gas Reinjection Act. In response to this Act, the Nigerian Agip Oil 
Company (NAOC), a subsidiary of Eni Exploration and Production which had 
established its oil and gas processing plant in Okpai-Kwale region, launched a gas 
recovery and utilisation project in 1987.
142
 
 
In 2005, with the CDM scheme under the Kyoto Protocol in place, the NAOC sought to 
register this project and in November 2006, it was registered as a CDM project under 
the name of the Recovery of associated gas that would otherwise be flared at Kwale oil-
gas processing plant, Nigeria (“Kwale project”).143 The Kwale plant has been receiving 
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gas and oil from fields in Okpai-Beniku-Kwale and a large portion of associated gas 
produced from the oil fields has been flared upon separation from the oil at the Kwale 
plant, in the absence of any economically viable outlet for this gas.
144
 This project aims 
at recovering, capturing and utilising associated gas that would otherwise be flared at 
the Kwale oil and gas processing plant in Delta State, Nigeria.
145
 In the project scenario, 
the captured gas will be marketed for use by end-consumers of gas. In the absence of 
any local market outlet for the gas, NAOC - the project participant - and its Joint 
Venture partners have created a market for the gas through the construction of an 
Independent gas-fired Power Plant at Okpai (480MW - Okpai IPP), consisting of a high 
efficiency combined cycle gas turbine electricity generating plant. 
 
4.2.2. Implications on Sustainable Development 
 
According to the final Project Design Document, a series of economic, environmental 
and social benefits are expected from implementing this project. With regard to 
economic benefits, emphasis is on expanding electricity generation capacity and 
improving electricity supply reliability at the national level.
146
 With this project in place, 
an additional 480 MW electricity capacity is expected to be added to the national power 
grid, accounting for 12% of the total capacity available at the beginning of 2002.
147
 
Such improvements in the capacity would lead to stability of the grid by reducing 
voltage fluctuations and power outages.
148
 In addition, such a project would contribute 
to real economic development in terms of innovation and technology transfer in the oil 
and gas industry, develop infrastructure, and trigger investments to kick-start flare 
reduction projects.
149
 
 
In terms of social benefits, the Project Design Document suggests provision of 
employment, transfer of technical knowledge to the local population and contribution to 
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rural poverty alleviation through provision of reliable power supplies.
150
 Nevertheless, 
whereas the aforementioned macro-economic benefits are expected to be realised, the 
delivery of social benefits, which implies the creation of social wealth of the local 
communities where the project is carried out, is in question. For example, there are 
analyses that there are very limited benefits in terms of employment generation and 
technology transfer to the local population from similar CDM projects for the 
unemployed youths of host oil and gas producing communities in the Niger Delta.
151
 
This is attributed to the characteristics of the oil and gas industry, which is primarily 
driven by technology and highly capital-intensive, using highly skilled manpower, 
which is in disfavour of the unskilled manpower of the local communities.
152
  With 
respect to the increased power supply to the local communities, more than 80% of the 
villages in the Niger Delta are still not connected to electricity line, despite the promise 
the Kwale project initially made.
153
 The projected electricity generated from the CDM 
project benefits primarily the wealthier urban communities in main urban cities and not 
the rural communities where the CDM project is carried out.
154
 In 2011, the traditional 
ruler of the Kwale community, Chief Emeka Uwaka, witnessed that six years after the 
CDM process began no community in Kwale has been connected to electricity. Neither 
Nigerian Agip Oil Company nor the government's electricity company, Power Holding 
Company of Nigeria, has yet connected electricity to these communities in spite of 
CDM promises.
155
 
 
The project must definitely deliver positive environmental impacts, at least, as it is 
meant to reduce the GHG emissions as a registered CDM project. Besides reduction in 
GHG emissions, the environmental degradation on soil, water and air due to the gas 
flaring activity should also be lessened as the project would reduce toxic orange flares. 
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However, Environmental Rights Action, Nigeria's leading environmental advocacy 
group, and Friends of the Earth, analysed in 2011 that  according to the monitoring 
report for three-year period between 2005 and 2009, submitted by the Nigerian Agip Oil 
Company to the UNFCCC, this only achieved a total reduction of 1,747,226 million 
tons of CO2 equivalent during the period, not meeting the initially expected amount in 
the Project Design Document, which is 1,496,934 million tons of CO2 equivalent per 
year.
156
 The same report, prepared by the two organisations, also questioned whether 
companies such as Nigerian Agip Oil Company and Shell actually use associated or 
cheaper non-associated gas in their gas recovery and utilisation projects, referring to the 
similar but non-CDM gas recovery and utilisation project in Afam, Nigeria by Shell, 
and that Shell recorded a 30 percent increase in GHG emissions in 2010.
157
 
 
Rewarding illegality 
Many environmental justice activists criticise the Kwale project registered under CDM 
as rewarding of unethical corporate practice of gas flaring with CER credits. As gas 
flaring has been prohibited from 1984 according to the Nigerian law, it is corporate 
responsibility to eliminate gas flaring. The World Bank also views that registering the 
Kwale project under CDM was an opportunistic move by oil companies operating in the 
Niger Delta to receive carbon credits for reducing gas flaring, which oil companies 
should have stopped doing if they were to comply with the relevant laws.
158
 
Furthermore, the initial efforts made by the NAOC to establish a gas recovery and 
utilisation project in 1987 to comply with the Nigerian law on gas reinjection means 
that the problem of gas flaring could have been addressed by the company without the 
CDM mechanism, which raises the question of additionality.
159
 In the same respect, 
Daphne Wyshame, from the Institute for Policy Studies in Washington, noted “This 
proposal by Nigeria should be regarded as a fraud by the CDM methodology board... to 
tell companies they will be paid for doing something they should have done decades ago 
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by law is to encourage corporate abuse everywhere.”160 
 
By rewarding the unethical corporate failure in environmental protection, it creates 
perverse incentives for oil companies to continue emitting GHG into the atmosphere 
from gas flaring, which would ironically result in long-term negative impacts on 
environment, despite the project's short-term assertion on reducing GHG gases, and thus, 
deepening the climate crises.  
 
4.2.3. Conclusion 
 
Although the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) states that gas flaring in 
Nigeria has been reduced by 6% as at the end of 2012, from 24% to 18%, and partly 
attributes this to the several CDM projects including the Kwale project
161
, it remains 
questionable and controversial weather it is appropriate to register such a project under 
CDM scheme. The very limited impacts on sustainable development, in terms of 
economic, social and environmental benefits, can be partly attributed to the lack of 
transparency in the process of approval and implementation. However, despite what 
could have been done in the process, the failure to increase social wealth witnessed not 
only in Kwale project but in other similar projects in Nigeria, such as Shell's Afam 
reinjection project, regardless of the registration under CDM scheme, shows that the 
projects of this type are almost innately appropriate to have positive social impacts.  
Along with the problem of rewarding illegality, this could have been addressed with 
more transparent stakeholder participation and a more transparent information 
disclosure system.
162
 If the NAOC as well as the Designated National Authority were 
held more accountable by local communities and CDM Executive Board, the Kwale 
project would not have been registered as a CDM project in the first place, earning CER 
credits by doing what should have been done already without gaining any reward.  
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4.3. Discussions 
 
The two CDM projects analysed above show that most of CDM projects would at least 
have positive economic benefits that any kind of large investment can offer. In terms of 
environmental impacts, CDM projects are meant to bring positive impacts on the 
environment as they should meet the requirement of reducing GHG emissions to be 
eligible under the CDM. However, like in the case of the Barro Blanco project, the local 
communities could suffer negative impacts on their surrounding environment. Although 
it does not seem easy for a CDM project to bring social benefits to the local 
communities, it would be hard to claim that a project contributes to sustainable 
development of the host communities if its social component is missing. In estimating 
social impacts of a project, public acceptance by the local communities should play a 
bigger role than what investors or project implementation bodies argue because the local 
communities would not say no to projects that would benefit them. The potential 
contribution to sustainable development must always be questioned when a project is 
faced with huge opposition of the local communities.  
 
In this respect, the key to avoid approving a project under the CDM which is doubtful of 
its sustainable development effects would be to increase the accountability of the 
mechanism not only in the process of registration and approval but also once a project is 
approved. Local communities should be able to hold investors, project entities and 
designated national authorities more accountable. The CDM executive board should 
also take into more account others‟ opinions than designated national authorities 
because in many cases those authorities are biased towards the interest of national 
governments, which is not necessarily that of local communities. The case of Barro 
Blanco project indicates how little accountability the current CDM has, the result of 
which was to let the project approved under the CDM even if there was lack of local 
consultation, lack of transparent information and the environmental impact assessment 
was unreliable. The Barro Blanco project was suspended after all, but by the national 
government‟s decision, which means that if there was no government will there would 
not have been a way to suspend it under the current CDM architecture. This highlights 
the need for recourse in the CDM as a way to ensure accountability even after approval 
and therefore, to safeguards better interest of the local communities. In the same line, 
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said Eva Filzmoser, Director of Carbon Market Watch, that “the CDM Board approved 
Barro Blanco when it was clear that the dam would flood the homes of numerous 
indigenous families. This decision is a warning signal that safeguards must be 
introduced to protect human rights, including robust stakeholder consultations and a 
grievance mechanism.”163 
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5. Conclusion 
 
From the perspective of distributional justice, the CDM under the Kyoto Protocol has 
two distinct implications. On one hand, it could undermine the distributional justice that 
the Kyoto Protocol intends to achieve by obliging only certain countries to commit to 
limit or reduce their GHG emissions. This is because it gives flexibility to Annex B 
Parties to pursue their quantified GHG emissions limitation or reduction targets in 
developing countries, where it is mostly cheaper to reduce emissions than in their own 
territories. As a result of Annex B countries exploiting existing low-cost ways to reduce 
emissions in developing countries, developing countries could be left only with more 
costly ways to reduce emissions when they are obliged to.
164
 On the other hand, the 
CDM could make up the possibly undermined equity among countries by making 
Annex B Parties assist developing countries in achieving their sustainable development 
objectives. In this sense, whether or not the CDM contributes to sustainable 
development of project recipient countries is crucial in discussing whether or not the 
CDM serves climate justice.  
 
However, the previous analyses of the CDM structure and the current profile of CDM 
projects in the section 3 as well as the case studies of Barro Blanco project and Kwale 
project imply that the current CDM may systematically lack the capacity to fulfil 
sustainable development objectives in developing countries. Firstly, not having a 
universal definition of sustainable development under the CDM and leaving the 
determination of contribution towards sustainable development at the national level 
have placed the realisation of sustainable development at the responsibility of host 
countries, for whom local communities‟ interests might not always come as priority. 
Accordingly, there is neither monitoring nor assessment system to ensure the realisation 
of sustainable development goals. Secondly, transparent local consultation lacked in 
both case studies, which, particularly in Barro Blanco project, led to very strong 
opposition of local communities and manifestations involving alleged human rights 
violations. Without adequate and transparent local consultation, it would be difficult to 
safeguard interests of local communities, which would generally coincide with realising 
                                                 
164Gordon, R., “Climate Change...,” op. cit., p.1610.  
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social component of sustainable development. Thirdly, the LDCs, those who actually 
need more assistance to move towards sustainable development, are sidelined under the 
current CDM. If a CDM project can be an opportunity for developing countries, it 
should be distributed justly and fairly to reach their sustainable development goals. 
Fourthly, specific types of projects that are more likely to undermine sustainable 
development should be more carefully examined, as the Kwale project has been 
criticised that giving CERs to such a project would rather reward illegality.  
 
Despite controversies over the contribution of the CDM to sustainable development, a 
post-2020 climate regime would still need a similar project-based and carbon-offset 
mechanism as some countries might be already too low-carbon to realise their reduction 
targets solely by domestic efforts. The Paris Agreement also mentions a “mechanism to 
contribute to the mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions and support sustainable 
development,” which will be further discussed afterwards.165 Learning lessons from the 
current CDM, such a mechanism would need to adopt specific and universal sustainable 
development requirements, have monitoring and assessment system to ensure a project‟s 
contribution towards sustainable development, require strengthened local consultation 
to safeguard interests of local communities and also balance distribution of projects 
among recipient countries.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
165 Article 6 of the Paris Agreement, Annex to the Adoption of the Paris Agreement,  UN Doc 
FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1 (12 December 2015). 
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